Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

OFTACOOP, a Puerto Rico ophthalmologist cooperative, has agreed to settle FTC charges that its actions harmed competition.  The complaint charges that  OFTACOOP – also known as Cooperativa de Médico Oftalmólogos de Puerto Rico –  unlawfully orchestrated an agreement among competing ophthalmologists to refuse to deal with a health plan, MCS Advantage, Inc., and its network administrator, Eye Management of Puerto Rico, LLC.  OFTACOOP’s concerted refusal to deal forced MCS to abandon its plan to engage Eye Management to create a lower-cost network of ophthalmologists. MCS was also forced to maintain its then-current reimbursement rates paid to ophthalmologists. According to the complaint, OFTACOOP restrained competition without any justification, in violation of federal antitrust law.  The proposed consent order prohibits OFTACOOP from entering into or facilitating agreements between or among ophthalmologists (1) to refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal, with any payor regarding any term, including price terms, or (2) not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor other than through OFTACOOP. The order also prohibits information exchanges to facilitate any prohibited conduct, and it bars any attempts to engage in any prohibited conduct. OFTACOOP is also barred from encouraging, suggesting, advising, pressuring, inducing, or trying to induce anyone to engage in any prohibited conduct.

Boehringer Ingelheim agreed to divest five types of animal health products in the United States in order to settle FTC charges that its proposed asset swap with Sanofi would likely be anticompetitive. Under the proposed swap, Boehringer Ingelheim acquired Sanofi’s animal care subsidiary, Merial, valued at $13.53 billion, and Sanofi obtained Boehringer Ingelheim’s consumer health care business unit, valued at $7.98 billion, as well as cash compensation of $5.54 billion. The FTC’s complaint alleges that without the divestitures the proposed asset swap would harm competition in the U.S. markets for various vaccines for companion animals (pets) and certain parasite control products for cattle and sheep. The proposed consent order preserves competition by requiring Boehringer Ingelheim to divest the companion animal vaccines to Eli Lilly and the company’s Elanco Animal Health division, and the parasite control products to Bayer AG.

Abbott Laboratories agreed to divest two medical device businesses to settle FTC charges that its proposed $25 billion acquisition of St. Jude Medical, Inc. would likely be anticompetitive. The FTC’s complaint alleges that without a remedy, the proposed acquisition would harm competition in the U.S. markets for vascular closure devices, which are used to close holes in arteries from the insertion of catheters, and for “steerable” sheaths, which are used to guide catheters for treating heart arrhythmias. Without a remedy, the merger will cause significant harm to competition in these two markets. The consent order requires the parties to divest to Tokyo-based medical device maker Terumo Corporation all rights and assets related to St. Jude’s vascular closure device business and Abbott’s steerable sheath business. The order requires both companies to assist Terumo with establishing its manufacturing capabilities. Under the order, Abbott is also required to notify the FTC if it intends to acquire lesion-assessing ablation catheter assets from Advanced Cardiac Therapeutics, known as ACT. Lesion-assessing ablation catheters provide feedback to physicians regarding the force being applied by the catheter or the temperature of the ablation target. Currently, only St. Jude and one other company provide lesion assessing ablation catheters in the United States. Abbott and ACT have formed a partnership to develop these catheters. After the acquisition of St. Jude, if Abbott acquired lesion-assessing ablation catheter assets from ACT, it could eliminate additional competition that would result from an independent ACT.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals, the parent of Bausch + Lomb, agreed to sell Paragon Holdings I, Inc. to settle charges that its May 2015 acquisition of Paragon reduced competition for the sale of FDA-approved buttons used for three types of gas permeable, or GP, lenses: orthokeratology lenses, worn to reshape the cornea; large-diameter scleral lenses, which cover the white of the eye and are used after eye surgery, for corneal transplants, and to treat eye disease; and general vision correction lenses. Valeant will sell Paragon in its entirety to a newly created entity, Paragon Companies LLC, headed by the former president of Paragon, Joe Sicari. Under the settlement, Paragon Companies also will acquire the assets of Pelican Products LLC – a contact lens packaging company that Valeant acquired after its purchase of Paragon – that is the only producer of FDA-approved vials used for shipping some GP lenses.

The FTC's order requires CentraCare Health, a healthcare provider in St. Cloud, Minnesota, to release some physicians from “non-compete” contract clauses, allowing them to join competing practices, under a settlement mitigating likely anticompetitive effects from CentraCare’s proposed merger with St. Cloud Medical Group (“SCMG”). CentraCare Health, a non-profit health system in central Minnesota, also includes a multi-specialty physician practice group. SCMG is a physician-owned, multi-specialty practice group that operates four clinics in and around St. Cloud. According to the FTC, CentraCare’s planned acquisition of SCMG would combine the two largest providers of adult primary care, pediatric, and OB/GYN services in the St. Cloud area. By eliminating SCMG as a potential alternative in the St. Cloud area, the acquisition would likely increase CentraCare’s bargaining power vis-à-vis commercial health plans, allowing it to raise reimbursement rates and secure more favorable terms, the complaint states. However, SCMG was failing financially, and a number of physicians had already left the practice. SCMG’s multi-year search did not identify an alternative purchaser to CentraCare for the entire group, but at least one local provider has expressed interest in expanding its practice by hiring some of SCMG’s physicians. The consent order permitted the acquisition to proceed, but lessened its potential anticompetitive effects by requiring CentraCare to allow a number of adult primary care, pediatric, and OB/GYN physicians to leave the health system and work for other local providers or establish a new practice in the area and to provide certain financial incentives to a number of departing physicians.

American Air Liquide Holdings, Inc. and Airgas, Inc., agreed to divest certain production and distribution assets to settle charges that their proposed $13.4 billion merger likely would have harmed competition and led to higher prices in several U.S. and regional markets. The companies will sell assets used to produce and supply seven types of industrial gas: bulk oxygen, bulk nitrogen, bulk argon, bulk nitrous oxide, bulk liquid carbon dioxide, dry ice, and packaged welding gases sold in retail stores. These gases are used in a number of industries, including oil and gas, steelmaking, health care, and food manufacturing, according to the complaint. Under the proposed settlement order, Air Liquide will sell these assets to a Commission-approved buyer within four months after it acquires Airgas. The proposed consent agreement includes an asset maintenance order to ensure that Air Liquide and Airgas continue to act independently and maintain the relevant assets until they are divested.

German cement producer HeidelbergCement AG and Italian producer Italcementi S.p.A. agreed to divest a cement plant in Martinsburg, WV and up to 11 cement distribution terminals in six other states to settle charges that their proposed $4.2 billion merger would likely harm competition in five regional markets for cement in the United States. Heidelberg and Italcementi are the second and fourth largest producers of cement in the world, and in the United States, the two companies compete through their respective U.S. subsidiaries, Lehigh Hanson and Essroc Cement Corp., to sell portland cement – an essential ingredient in making concrete. According to the FTC complaint, the merger as proposed would harm competition for portland cement in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore-Washington, DC; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, Virginia; Syracuse, New York; and Indianapolis, Indiana. In each of these markets, the FTC alleges the merger as originally proposed would have reduced the number of competitively significant suppliers from three to two. The proposed consent agreement requires the merged company to divest to an FTC-approved buyer an Essroc cement plant and quarry in Martinsburg, West Virginia; seven Essroc terminals in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania; and a Lehigh terminal in Solvay, New York. At the buyer’s option, the order also requires the merged company to divest two additional Essroc terminals in Ohio. Under the proposed order, these divestitures must occur within 120 days after the merger is complete. In addition, the merged company has ten days after the merger is complete to divest Essroc’s terminal in Indianapolis to Cemex, Inc.

ON Semiconductor Corporation agreed to sell its Ignition IGBT business in order to settle charges that its proposed $2.4 billion acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc. would likely substantially lessen competition in the worldwide market for Ignition IGBTs, resulting in higher prices and reduced innovation. Ignition IGBTs are semiconductors that function as solid-state electronic switches in the ignition systems of automotive internal combustion engines.  The order preserves competition by requiring ON to divest its Ignition IGBT business to Chicago-based manufacturer Littelfuse, Inc. The divestiture includes design files and intellectual property that Littelfuse needs to manufacture ON’s Ignition IGBTs. ON must also facilitate the transfer of its customer relationships to Littelfuse, and supply Ignition IGBTs for Littlefuse to sell to customers while Littelfuse sets up its manufacturing operations.

Fortiline, LLC, a company that distributes ductile iron pipe, fittings and accessories throughout much of the United States, agreed to  settle charges that it violated federal antitrust law by inviting a competitor to raise and fix prices. This is the first case where the FTC has challenged an invitation to collude by a firm that is both a direct competitor with, and a distributor for, the invitee. According to an administrative complaint filed by the FTC, on two occasions in 2010, Fortiline invited a competing firm, which mainly manufactures ductile iron pipe but also engaged in direct sales to contractors, to collude on pricing in North Carolina and most of Virginia. In some areas, Fortiline competes with this firm – identified in the complaint as “Manufacturer A” – by distributing ductile iron pipe (“DIP”) products made by another DIP manufacturer, identified as “Manufacturer B.” In other areas, Fortiline distributes the product of Manufacturer A. The FTC’s complaint alleges that on two occasions when Fortiline was competing with Manufacturer A, Fortiline communicated an invitation to collude on DIP pricing.The proposed consent order prohibits Fortiline from entering into, attempting to enter into, or inviting any agreement with any competitor to raise or fix prices, divide markets, or allocate customers.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. agreed to sell the rights and assets related to 79 pharmaceutical products to settle FTC charges that its proposed $40.5 billion acquisition of Allergan plc’s generic pharmaceutical business would be anticompetitive. The remedy requires Teva to divest the drug portfolio to eleven firms, and will preserve competition in U.S. pharmaceutical markets where Teva and Allergan compete now or would likely have competed in the future if not for the merger. The divested products include anesthetics, antibiotics, weight loss drugs, oral contraceptives, and treatments for a wide variety of diseases and conditions, including ADHD, allergies, arthritis, cancers, diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, mental illnesses, opioid dependence, pain, Parkinson’s disease, and respiratory, skin and sleep disorders. The acquirers of the divested products are Mayne Pharma Group Ltd., Impax Laboratories, Inc., Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Sagent Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Cipla Limited, Zydus Worldwide DMCC, Mikah Pharma LLC, Perrigo Pharma International D.A.C., Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., Prasco LLC and 3M Company.  In addition to the product divestitures, to address the anticompetitive effects likely to arise in markets for 15 pharmaceutical products where Teva supplies active pharmaceutical ingredients to current or future Allergan competitors, the FTC order additionally requires Teva to offer these existing API customers the option of entering into long-term API supply contracts.

Mylan Inc. agreed to divest the rights and assets related to two generic pharmaceutical products in order to settle FTC charges that its proposed $7.2 billion acquisition of Swedish drug maker Meda would be anticompetitive. The FTC order preserves competition in the markets for 250 mg generic carisoprodol tablets, which treat muscle spasms and stiffness, and for 400 mg and 600 mg generic felbamate tablets, which treat refractory epilepsy. Under the proposed order, the U.S.-based generic pharmaceutical company Alvogen Pharma US, Inc. will acquire all of Mylan’s rights and assets related to 400 mg and 600 mg felbamate tablets. The proposed order also requires Mylan to provide transitional services and take all actions that are necessary for Alvogen to obtain FDA approval to manufacture and market 400 mg and 600 mg generic felbamate tablets. According to the FTC’s complaint, Meda and one other company currently market 250 mg generic carisoprodol tablets, and Mylan, which owns the U.S. marketing rights to a recently approved carisoprodol product, is the next likely entrant. Without a remedy, the acquisition would eliminate Mylan’s entry as a third independent competitor, delaying beneficial competition and future price decreases. Under the proposed order, Mylan must relinquish its U.S. marketing rights for the drug. With the settlement, Indicus Pharma LLC, which owns the product, manufactures it, and markets it internationally, will compete independently in the U.S. market.

Energy companies Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (“ETE”), and The Williams Companies, Inc., agreed to divest Williams’ interest in an interstate natural gas pipeline to proceed with ETE’s proposed acquisition of Williams. According to the complaint, the proposed merger, if consummated, would have reduced competition in the market for “firm” – i.e., guaranteed – pipeline capacity to deliver natural gas to points within the Florida peninsula. In Florida, natural gas is extensively used for electric power generation, making competitive access to constant and reliable sources of supply critical. The complaint alleges that absent a remedy, the acquisition would eliminate the competition between FGT and Gulfstream, which historically has enabled Florida customers to obtain lower transportation rates and better terms of service. It also would have resulted in a pipeline monopoly at many natural gas delivery points within the peninsula.  The complaint also alleges that the proposed merger likely would harm future competition from a new interstate pipeline, Sabal Trail Transmission LLC, which is scheduled to start transporting natural gas to parts of the Florida peninsula in May 2017. According to the complaint, Sabal Trail and its future customers will rely on leased access to a segment of the Transco Pipeline, a Williams-owned, large interstate pipeline, for natural gas supply. The complaint alleges that the newly merged company would have an incentive to deny Sabal Trail additional capacity expansions on Transco because ETE’s FGT pipeline is a closer competitor to Sabal Trail than was Williams’ Gulfstream pipeline.